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The brain, the mind and the self are usually described as sepa-
rate entities, although we intuitively recognize that they share some
kind of relationship. The puzzle, however, begins when one tries to
understand how a human being lives as a unique person with a brain,
a mind and a self. Pondering about such questions is as old as human-
ity and dierent solutions have been given. In this short essay, I will
compare the thinking of Donald MacCrimmon MacKay with some of
the ongoing theories about the relationships between the brain and
the self. MacKay’s views about the person overcome current mecha-
nistic and emergentist positions. In addition, his acknowledgment of
a subjective perspective, which he called the I-Story, in tension with
an objective Brain story, helps us to recognize and interact with the
person even when the brain has been physically damaged.
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1 the human person
The human person is a powerful agent in the world, a self-conscious agent
having the natural capacity to move herself as a whole, and to manipulate
events in the physical world. As conscious agents, we can plan and success-
fully accomplish physical actions, which usually come through our deliber-
ate intentions.1 Our selves can intentionally aect other persons, and can be
aected by them. The power of the human self is not something extrinsic or
just added, but it is quite comprehensible in the broad world of intentional
life, showing itself as the highest degree of self-organization and teleological
control that we know in the universe.2
Several explanations and interpretations of the causal relationships in
the brain-self problem are available.3 Dualism assumes that the brain and
the self are separate things, leading to the unanswered question of men-
tal causation and interaction between dissimilar entities. In a contrasting
position, physicalism (materialism) assumes that everything obeys physical
laws. Physicalism also collides with the unsolvable question of how the self
can be explained or reduced to the activity of individual parts of the brain.
Two conicting views derive from physicalism. One is to deny the existence
of the self, which would only be an illusion created by the brain.4
Emergentist materialism, on the other hand, considers mental states,
events and processes as plain operations of the central nervous system
which are emergent relative to its chemical and cellular components.5 In
the words of Roger Sperry, “the special vital forces that distinguish living
things from the non-living are emergent, holistic properties of the living
entities themselves. They are not properties of their physico-chemical
components nor can they be fully explained merely in terms of physics and
chemistry. This does not mean they are in any way supernatural, mystical,
or dualistic. Those who conceived vital forces in supernatural terms were
just as wrong as those who denied their existence”.6 Nevertheless, there
is not yet a clear denition of how the self appears as an emergent
phenomenon from the brain.7
The human person can also be viewed from the hylomorphic point of
view, which implies that understanding of human nature cannot be solely
based on ecient and material causes. The latter suce for most practical
purposes, but grasping the whole human person also requires the reference
to formal and nal causes. Beyond the familiar molecular, cellular and other
functional structures making up our bodies, we are also endowed with a sub-
stantial form, the soul that, in the tradition of Aristotle, is the rst internal
principle of being alive.8 Thomistic dualism predicted a correlation between
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mind and brain, but not identity or reduction. In this case, the mind oper-
ates independently of the body, fashioning the human soul as a special kind
of form. Nonetheless, Aquinas supported that every substance has only a
single substantial form displaying various powers, thus acknowledging that
the soul, and not the intellect, is the form of the body.9
2 the person in the writings of donald m. mackay
MacKay theorized that the relationship between mechanistic brain science
and the personal, moral and religious dimensions of human nature is much
more harmonious and constructive than it is generally thought.10 This au-
thor supported a subjective approach, which he called the I-Story, in tension
with the objective “Brain story”, as two equally valid modes of describing
an isomorphic reality. Most important, he recognized that the I-story, where
the I stands both for inside and also for the rst person singular, is an inside
not directly accessible to other persons.11 Signicantly, this inside gives rise
to the thing we value most in other people, the possibility of engaging in the
I-Thou relationship of dialogue, which is a great contributor to the I-story.12
The I-story depicts facts about us and our consciousness that can only
be described in the rst person singular. Brain science assumes that for ev-
ery fact of experience recounted by the I-story, there is a corresponding fact
about the state of the brain. Although this is just a working hypothesis, it
has a large experimental support. However, there is no evidence that only
one brain state corresponds to one fact of our experience. The same brain
state could originate in dierent experiences, whereas a single experience
could relate to several dierent brain states. We cannot assume that there
is an exact correlation between the brain- and the I-stories, but we can the-
orize that no change in my conscious experience or my dreams is devoid
of modications in the structure and activity of my brain system. Note also
that changes occurring throughout the body may also aect the Brain-story,
and will also impinge on the I-story. The main conclusion of this brief de-
scription is that thinking is an activity of the person (I think). By contrast,
it is nonsensical to say that my brain thinks, as nonsensical as saying that
it is my mind that thinks. As stated by MacKay,13 our conscious experience
is embodied in our brain activity, neither identical to the brain, nor quasi-
physically interactive with it.
A conceptual gap still exists between the I- and the Brain-stories, entic-
ing the unwary to a dualist or physicalist hypothesis as described before.
However, MacKay’s interpretation goes in a dierent way, based on the lan-
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guage and ideas of engineering and information theory. Engineering terms
straightforwardly apply to the Brain-story, as its various states depend on
chemical and neural circuits. Information language is best adapted to the
I-story. As conscious agents, we pursue goals, evaluate their possible out-
comes, and even if we do not take an immediate action we are prepared
for those actions.14 “Form determining form gives rise to information ow”.
Force determining force, as in physical phenomena, can involve a ow of
energy, but not necessarily in the same direction as the information ow.
Energy and information ows are two dierent notions. Thus, systems han-
dling information may have more than one level of causation without any
rivalry between them. Similarly, the Brain-story and the I-story are not op-
posites but equally valid complementary forms of causality and explanation.
Determination in dierent levels does not mean that only one level is the real
one, or one reigns above the other, or the other is something else.15
At dierence with the various manifestations of dualism and epiphe-
nomenalism, there is no reason to consider the Brain- and the I-story as
dierent things. As conscious agents we always know our I-story, but are
not automatically aware of our Brain-Story, suggesting a certain primacy of
the rst one. However, both are harmoniously complementary since they
represent dierent aspects, but not two dierent levels, of a unitary situa-
tion. MacKay described his views as “comprehensive realism”. It is a kind of
“realism” because we reckon not only our conscious experience, but also the
physical data (learnt through our conscious experience) about our brains. It
is comprehensive because we do not enclose these stories into two dierent
compartments. We confront and correlate them, recognizing in this appar-
ent dualism the “unity of the cognitive agent that each of us is”.16
In the words of Mackay, both “the interactionist and the materialist are
each seeking to conserve a real truth about our human nature –the material-
ist recognizes that our physical embodiment invites (and rewards) analysis
in the same physical terms as the rest of the material world. The interaction-
ist recognizes that the reality of what it is to be a conscious agent is richer
–has more to it– that can be described in material (or for that matter in
mental) terms alone”. Mackay arms that he wishes to put forward an op-
tion which can “do justice to what mechanistic materialism and Cartesian
interactionism are respectively trying to conserve, without their negative
implications”.17
I have not been able to nd any reference to hylomorphism in MacKay’s
works. Although from dierent points of view, both theories take us to a
similar result, a unique and unied human person, where conscious experi-
ence is embodied in our brain activity, rather than interacting with the brain
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from another world, or being identical to the brain in a reductionist way.
To illustrate these points, I will explore some brain mechanisms that, by
their association with mental functions, may be unknowingly construed as
interaction points between the brain and the self. On the other hand, neu-
rological conditions that hinder communication with other persons, such
as dementia, may be easily misidentied with a loss of the self, implying a
separation between mind and brain. However, personhood and the human
self can be recognized regardless of severe cognitive impairment.
3 brain microstates and thought
The modular paradigm, where brain areas would act as independent proces-
sors for specic cognitive functions does not explain cognitive operations
and might be misleading.18 However, cognitive functions depend on tran-
sient neuronal ensembles organized at multiple spatial scales, from individ-
ual neurons, to neuronal populations, to large-scale networks. Current un-
derstanding acknowledges that the momentary global functional state of the
brain can be reected by the momentary conguration of the electrical eld,
as shown by multichannel electro-encephalogram (EEG) signals. Microstate
analysis is a processing protocol that allows the denition of momentary
states of the brain electrical activity. The alpha frequency band (8-12 hz) of
the multichannel resting-state EEG signal can be parsed into a limited num-
ber of distinct quasi-stable states. Although a large number of possible maps
can be recorded, most of the signal can be found in a few topographies. A
single map remains dominant for about 80–120 ms before abruptly tran-
sitioning to another map. These periods of quasi-stability of single maps,
known as microstates, display a rich syntax with parameters such as aver-
age duration (lifespan), frequency of occurrence, coverage (or dominance),
topographical shape, amplitude of the global eld power.19 Signicantly,
the transition probabilities of one microstate to any other are non-random.
Transitions between microstates have been interpreted as the sequential ac-
tivation of dierent neural networks. Functionally, they have been associ-
ated to ongoing mental processes. For example, microstates show dierent
patterns when the person is involved in abstract thought than when thought
is related to visual imagery.20 Moreover, the microstate at the moment of ap-
pearance of an external stimulus inuences the processing of that stimulus
in the brain.21 These studies suggest that individual microstates may corre-
spond to particular classes of mentation, and that ongoing mental processes
inuence how incoming information is processed and reacted to. These nd-
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ings led to consider microstates as the “atoms of thought”, an hypothesis
postulating that: (a) the neural network(s) activated during a particular mi-
crostate represent dierent states of the conscious mind; (b) that each mi-
crostate is associated with a dierent class of mentation; (c) that microstates
make up the conscious state.22 Brain science makes the “working assump-
tion” (and it is no more than an assumption) that for each fact of our con-
scious experience, some matching story can be told in neural terms. How-
ever, nothing indicates that the correspondence is necessarily one to one.
“Several alternative states of neural activity, for example, might be possi-
ble correlates of exactly the same experience ... but at least if I am having
that experience, brain science assumes that something must be true about
my nervous system, which would not be the case if I were not having it”.23
Microstates probably are a hint of how our thoughts are embodied in our
brain, but the conscious experience is not identical with brain activity nor is
it quasi-physically interactive with it. Therefore, evidence supports parts a
and b of the “atoms of thought” hypothesis, since microstates belong to the
brain-story. By contrast, there is no place for part c, because this belongs
to the I-story. In spite of the high degree of sophistication required for the
detection of microstates, and their eventual correlation with thinking pro-
cesses, these neurophysiological states do not have the relevant qualitative,
intentional, and intelligible aspects of mental states.
4 “out of mind” does not mean the lack of a self
People with dementia (demens = without mind) may be “out of their minds”
but not without a self. As any other human person, they are agents of mean-
ing. Although the I-story of the demented person seems unreachable, these
persons know more than they can tell. Nonetheless, willingness is required
to communicate with them.24
Consciousness of one’s own mental states (self-consciousness) seems to
be inseparable from memory; thus, severance of our connection with our
past threatens our way of being-in-the-world. In the words of a patient,
“like you are totally in a foreign land, and nothing is known to you. But
at the same time you know you are supposed to know ... like looking for
something that just isn’t there. Empty, lonely, isolated. But you keep look-
ing for something familiar, that you know is there, but you just can’t see
it”.25 The onset of dementia may be viewed as a threat to self, giving rise to
attempts of regaining control through a range of psychological strategies.
Thus, patients can usually acknowledge their memory problems, indicating
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a basic awareness of these changes, but make capricious judgements about
their meaning and impact.26 Awareness of the disease also depends on psy-
chological and social factors, such as mood, self-concept and personality.27
Alzheimer’s disease patients have diculties in mentally travelling back to
a more or less distant past to reexperience past events. By contrast, these
patients are still able to remember decontextualized information up to at
least the middle stage of the disease.28 Dementia is accompanied by alter-
ations of self-consciousness, but not by its abolition. In these patients, lack
of awareness and self-consciousness include separate aspects, such as the
awareness of the disease, of perception, of one’s own history, and of one’s
body, as well as a moral consciousness. Remarkably, Alzheimer’s disease
patients conserve an almost normal capacity for introspection, and do not
show changes in moral judgement. Thus, these observations support the
maintenance of self.29
With progression of the disease, self-awareness ability decreases and
patients appear unable to understand “What the self wants to do” (the self-
intention) and “What the self wants to be done” (the self-desire). Next they
become unable to understand “What the self is doing” (the self-situation).
Finally, being unable to make the psychological distinction between the self
and others, they become unable to perform human relationships, and to
carry out activities of daily living”. However, even at these advanced stages,
embodied selfhood remains as evidence of a fundamental level of existence
that does not involve cognitive consciousness.30 In spite of the apparent
meaninglessness and irrelevance of speech in dementia, persons interacting
with a demented patient can recognize an I-story. Even if this story seems
disconnected from present circumstances, or obviously fabricated, the story
clearly belongs to the self (“when I noticed that his front tooth was bro-
ken, I asked, ‘What happened?’, and the subject cooked up a story, saying,
‘My daughter took me for a ride in her car but she suddenly and unexpect-
edly braked very hard. That’s why my tooth is broken”. 31The I-story is not
reected by the textual aspects of the narratives, but by its performative
and collaborative aspects. When linguistic and other cognitive abilities are
impaired, the person with dementia will use other available assets. Autobi-
ographical stories will be mainly told using embodied experiences like vi-
sual perception and motor actions, and gesticulation, together with various
forms of body language, which may replace verbal communication.32
FORUM Volume 3 (2017) 223–232 229
ángela m. suburo
5 conclusions
Human minds do not exist independently of human brains, at least on this
life. Brain processes can be isolated, and it can be shown that they are mech-
anistically important for human functions. However, they cannot represent
the human person as a unit. On the other hand, human persons may be
subjected to brain dysfunction or damage, as during anesthesia or neurode-
generative diseases. Nonetheless, a human self can still be recognized in de-
mented and psychotic persons, even if we must resort to unusual forms of
communication. The Brain-story and the I-story, as proposed in MacKay’s
comprehensive realism, provide a coherent model to understand the unity
of the person in the physical world.
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